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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
LOTTIE B. BES.T, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 8235 
MARILYNN HUBER, FRED HUBER 
and FRED HUBER COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
f-;TATEl\fENT OF' FACTS 
This cause was tried before a jury, in the District 
Court For Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which re-
turned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for damages suffer-
ed in an automobile collision. 
On January 16, 1953, plaintiff was a front-seat pas-
senger in her automobile being driven by her husband, 
northerly along 11th East Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and the vehicle was stopped at the stop sign for north-
bound traffic situated at the south of the intersection of 
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11th East and 5th South Streets, and had been stopped 
a few minutes awaiting opportunity to enter the inter-
section (R. 31), when plaintiffs' automobile was struck 
directly in the rear by a vehicle driven by defendant, 
Marilynn Huber (R. 70). Salt Lake Police Officer, 
Piers'on, investigated the accident and determined that 
11th East Street is 51 feet wide; that the point of impact 
was 27 feet south of the 5th South Curb Line and 21 
feet west from the east curb line of 11th East Street; that 
the plaintiffs' automobile was damaged in the rear (R. 
4); that plaintiffs' 1941 Cadillac sedan was moved 15 
feet by the impact; that he inspected and checked the 
brake pedal of defendant's vehicle and found that the 
brake pedal depressed to the floorboard until it was 
pumped four or five times, then it stayed up a little 
ways (R. 5) and felt fairly solid (R. 12) ; that upon in-
spection of ground and wheels, no evidence of brake fluid 
leaking could be found (R. 5); that the distance within 
which a motor vehicle can be halted for an unanticipated 
stop under conditions of 11th East Street at a speed of 
25 miles per hour is 32 feet braking distance plus 27 feet 
reaction distance or a total of 59 feet; at 30 n1iles per -, 
hour the braking distance is 46 feet and the reaction 
distance 33 feet, or total of 79 feet (R. 6). ili1 
00 
The defendant, Marilynn Huber, was called to testify or, 
by plaintiff as an adverse party, and testified that she IIi 
ha;d driven westerly on 8th South Street to 11th East ha 
Street, having come down the 8th South hill in second h 
gear and 'braking with the foot brake, traveling at 25 to 
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30 miles per hour, and made a right turn at 11th East 
Street without coming to a complete stop (R 14 & 15); 
that she proceeded northerly along 11th East Street and 
from the intersection at 6th 'South Street could see ve-
hicles stopped at the stop sign at 5th South Street (R 
16) ; that there were no other cars between defendant's 
vehicle and plaintiffs' vehicle and nothing obstructed 
defendant's vision as she approached 5th South; that 
she traveled in the portion of the street immediately 
east of the center line; that no cars were on the right 
side of defendant at any time as she approached 5th 
South Street (R 17); that she was traveling 20 or 25 
miles per hour as she approached 5th South (R 18) but 
admitted that she previously testified upon deposition 
that she was traveling 23 or 30 miles per hour when she 
first applied the brakes (R. 20); that she was 2lf2 to 3 
car lengths from plaintiffs' vehicle when she applied her 
brakes (R 18); that there were no other cars east of 
plaintiffs' vehicle as she approached (R 18); that she did 
not remove her foot from the accellerator until she was 
about 2lj2 to 3 car lengths a\Yay (R. 19); that when she 
first pressed the brake pedal it went to the floor board 
and she pumped the brakes two or three times before 
the collision (R 21); that she had never previously pump-
ed brakes, but that it was common sense to pump tlie 
brakes to add more braking (R 21); that she had ridden 
with a boy friend who pumped his brakes as a matter of 
habit though his brakes were good (R 22) ; that the hand 
brake on defendant's car was in good condition but that 
·she did not attempt to use the hand brake; that she did 
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not turn easterly to go around the right side of plain-
tiffs' car because hy the time she pumped the brakes 
there was no time to turn (R 22) and she made no attempt 
to turn aside to avoid direct collision with plaintiffs' 
vehicle (R 70); that she knew the stop sign was at the 
intersection of 5th South and 11th East Streets having 
traveled this route nearly every day since she started 
driving (R 72) 
ST'ATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MOTIONS 
OF THE DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS, FOR DIRECTED 
VERDI·CT AND TO SET ASIDE VERDICT, THERE BEING· 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
AND JUDGMENT. 
POINT II. 
A P AR'TY IS NOT BOUND BY THE TESTIMONY OF AN 
ADVERSE WITNESS WHOM HE HAS CALLED FOR EXAMI-
NATION, EVEN 'TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH TESTI-
MONY IS NOT REBUTTED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MOTIONS 
OF THE DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS, FOR DIRECTED 
VERDI·CT AND TO SET ASIDE VERDICT, THERE BEING 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 1• 
AND JUDGMENT. 
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This court has on many occasiOns stated the rule 
regarding the propriety of directing a verdict. A very 
recent pronouncement of the rule by this court in the case 
of lana Combs vs. William D. Perry, File No. 8097, Oc-
tober 22, 1954, reaffirms the test as to when a motion 
for directed verdict should be granted, as follows: 
'Taking the evidence, together with every in-
ference fairly arising therefrom, in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, reasonable minds could 
fairly say that they were not convinced by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
failed to use reasonable care under the circum-
stances. 
The trial court may not weigh the evidence nor determine 
where the preporrderance is, but if there is some substan-
tial evidence in support of the essential facts which the 
plaintiff is required to prove in order to entitle her to 
recover, or if the evidence and the inferences deducible 
therefrom are of a character which would cause reason-
able men to arrive at different conclusions with respect 
to whether all of the essential facts were or were not 
proved, the question is one of fact for the jury and not 
one of law for the court. Christensen vs. Utah Rapid 
Transit Co., 83 Utah 231, 27 P. 2d 468; Stickle v. Union 
Pacific R. Co., ______ Utah ______ , 251 P. 2d 867. 
The evidence adduced at trial fairly supports the 
verdict of the jury in finding the defendants negligent 
in at least one or more of the following particulars: 
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(a) Driving a motor vehicle on the highway without 
adequate brakes. 
(b) Failure to apply the hand brake. 
(c) Failure to turn to avoid the collision. 
(d) Failure to apply the foot brakes timely enough. 
(a) Regarding the negligence of the defendant for 
driving with inadequate brakes, the jury was instructed 
as follows (R. 27) : 
Instruction No. 11 
''You are instructed that the law of the state 
of Utah as set forth in the State Statutes in force 
and effect at the tirne of the accident provided as 
follows: 
41-6-144 
(a) The following brake equipment is 
required: 
'(1) Every motor vehicle, other than a 
rnotorcycle or motor driven cycle when oper-
ated upon a highway shall be equipped with 
brakes adequate to control the movement of 
and to stop and hold such vehicle, including 
two separate means of applying the brakes, 
each of which means shall be effective to ap-
ply the brakes to at least two wheels. If these 
two separate means of applying the brakes 
are connected in any way, they shall be so 
constructed that failure of any one part of 
the operating mechanism shall not leave the 
motor vehicle without brakes of at least two 
wheels." 
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The defendant, as she drove along 11th East toward 
the stop sign which she knew to be at the 5th South inter-
section, was not faced with an emergency stop, but was 
anticipating a stop (R. 72). The defendant admitted 
that she had previously testified upon deposition that 
she was traveling between 25 and 30 miles per hour when 
she first applied her brakes (R. 20). It is common knowl-
edge and practice with every reasonable driver that in 
approaching an anticipated stop, the foot brake is gradu-
ally engaged to bring the vehicle to a gradual stop. 
Officer Pierson testified that for an emergency stop at 
a speed of 30 miles per hour the braking distance is 46 
feet of solid braking plus a reaction distance of 33 feet, 
or a total of 79 feet. Thus if the defendant ha:d been mak-
ing an emergency stop she would have required 79 feet 
to stop from the time she first noticed the necessity for 
stopping. The jury could reasonably conclude that the 
defendant, in preparing for a known stop, would have to 
apply her brakes much in advance of that required for 
an emergency stop, and in so doing, if her brakes had 
suddenly failed her, she would have known this fact while 
she was yet some distance from the plaintiff's car and 
would have made an effort to turn, use the hand brake 
or otherwise endeavor to avoid the collision. However, 
the fact that the defendant stated that she kept traveling 
directly towards plaintiffs' car and pumped the foot 
brake pedal rather than to employ other methods of brak-
ing or attempting to turn as she pumped, is a strong 
indication to the jury that the defendant had previously 
pumped her brakes and that the brakes after being 
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pumped had held on previous occasions but became pro-
gressively worse s·o that on this occasion it required 
more pumping than previously. rrhis is borne out by the 
fact that she claimed never to have been in the ha'bit of 
pumping brakes, never knew anyone who pumped the 
pedal to correct faulty brakes, and yet she claimed that 
instinctively on this occasion she pumped the brakes. 
·rhe inference from her testimony is that she would have 
eontinued to pump the brakes several1nore times if the 
collision ha:d not intervened. The officer testified that he 
inspected the wheels and the ground for any leaks in the 
brake system and found no evidence of leakage, and that 
the brake was fairly solid after being pumped four or five 
times, which testimony the jury could consider in nega-
tiving a sudden failure of brakes (R. 6). Furthermore, 
the claim of the defendant that the brakes upon the next 
prior application of the brakes on the 8th South Street 
hill, held when only depressed one-quarter of the brake 
pedal distance makes it incredible that the brakes would 
suddenly fail upon a gradual application for an antici-
pated stop. These facts reasonably prove that the foot 
brake system had been defective for some time and re-
quired the pumping procedure before effective operation. 
(b) Defendant testified that the car she was driving 
was equipped with a hand brake in good operating condi-
tion, but that she failed to use the same (R. 22). 
The duty of the defendant to have used the hand 
brake is stated by necessary implication in the case of 
Sams v. Ada.ms Transfer & Storage Co., et al., (:~Iissouri, 
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1950) 234 S.W. 2d 593. Plaintiff was a passenger in a 
streetcar which was struck at an intersection by a truck 
driven by defendant's ernployee. The truck driver testi-
fied that as he was approaching the intersection, he step-
ped on the foot brake and found that it was out of com-
rnission. He then reached for the hand brake but the 
best he could do was to keep the truck, which was going 
about 25 miles per hour, from increasing speed. He 
sounded the horn of the truck continuously from that 
tirne until the truck struck the streetcar. He turned to 
the left at the intersection in an attempt to go north on 
the west side of the streetcar but because of the speed 
of the truck was unable to rnake the turn, and the truck 
struck the streetcar. He testified that he had made two 
stops that rnorning and that the vacuum booster brakes 
operated by a foot pedal were working efficiently, but 
failed hirn at this intersection. Judgment for the Plain-
tiff was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri 
which said at page 594: 
"As we review the evidence of the truck 
driver, Adams was guilty of negligence as a mat-
ter of law. Conceding that the vacuum booster 
brakes were working efficiently that morning and 
failed suddenly, the evidence shows the contrary 
as to the hand brake. 
It is agreed that under the law the truck was 
required to be equipped with two sets of adequate 
brakes in good working order .... The driver of 
the truck stated that when the vacuum booster 
brakes failed he attempted to use the hand brake 
which 'seemed to hold it (the truck) from going 
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much faster but it wouldn't bring it to a stop.' 
There is no evidence in this record that the hand 
brake failed suddenly. The only inference- to be 
drawn from the evidence is that the hand brake 
was weak, inadequate, and inefficient. .Adams in 
its brief stated that the evidence disclosed the 
brakes were regularly inspected. The driver did 
testify that 'The equipment is inspected regularly 
by the shop.' .As to the meaning of 'regularly' 
was are left in the dark. The witness may have 
meant yearly, monthly, or daily .... Enough has 
been said to show that under the evidence it must 
he ruled that .Adams was guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law." ... "No evidence was produced in 
the case before us of any legal excuse why the 
hand brake was inadequate." 
The court then reviews a case cited by .Adams but states 
that it is against Adams' theory. This was the case of 
Lochmoeller v. Kiel, Mo . .App., 137 S.W. 2d 625, reviewed 
at page 595·: 
".As we read that case it is authority against 
.Adams' theory. The facts in the two cases were 
similar except that the collision in the Lochmoeller 
case was very slight and the brakes on the truck 
failed when an attempt was made to stop the truck 
at the stop sign and within a few feet of the street-
car. The plaintiff submitted his case to a jury on 
the charge of negligence of defective brakes as a 
question of fact. The owner of the truck intro-
duced evidence that the brakes were up to the 
time of the collision in good working order and 
that .without warning a small gasket had blown 
out of the braking mechanism. The court held 
1 it 
i[l 
1 
lji 
ill 
iJi 
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that plaintiff had submitted the question of negli-
gence as one of fact and therefore could not con-
tend on appeal that it was a question of law." 
(c) Defendant testified that her vehicle collided 
directly into the rear of the Plaintiff's vehicle and that 
the reason she didn't attempt to turn one way or the 
other was that she didn't have time to do so (R. 70). The 
jury could reasonably have found that the defendant 
could have turned her vehicle within a much shorter dis-
tance than she could have stopped the sa1ne; that if the 
defendant's brakes really surprised defendant by sudden 
failure, the defendant would and should have turned the 
steering wheel, even slightly, at the same time she was 
pumping the brake pedal, to avoid the collision. Defend-
ant testified that the lane to her right was clear and open 
for travel during her entire approach (R. 17), that there 
were no cars on the east side of plaintiff's car (R. 18). 
The officer testified that the point of impact was 21 feet 
west of the east curb (R. 4), leaving sufficient space for 
passing on the right side. From these facts the jury could 
reasonably have found that the defendant was negligent 
in failing to turn to avoid the collision. The duty of the 
defendant to employ other means to avoid the accident 
is set forth in the following two cases :R'ussell v. Electric 
Garage Co., Nebraska 1912, 90 Neb. 719~ 134 N.W. 253. 
Defendant's electric automobile collided with plaintiff's 
hack causing personal injuries to plaintiff. From aver-
dict and judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Af-
firmed upon remittur of part of the damages. The facts 
are set forth in the following portion of the opinion: 
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"The vehicles were traveling in the smne di-
rection, east, and at substantially the same rate 
of speed. At the point where they were traveling 
there was a slight down grade, but there is no 
evidence to show that the street was not perfectly 
level north and south between the curbs .... When 
he (defendant) finally saw the hack about 25 feet 
ahead of hhn, the only effort he made to avoid a 
collision was by applying the brakes. When he a p-
plied the1n the car began to skid. Observing then 
that his brakes were not having the desired effect, 
we think it was plainly his duty to have used 
his steering lever and turned out so as to avoid 
the collision. That the mechanism of his car was 
all in working order, and that there was ample 
room to have passed the hack on either side, is 
adn1itted. The driver says he was helpless. That, 
under the evidence, is an unwarranted conclusion. 
If he had testified that, when he found his brakes 
were not going to prevent a collision, he tried to 
turn out, but was unable to do so, that claim 1night 
have been n1ade with some show of reason. \Ve do 
not think it is a sufficient exercise of diligence 
by the driver of an automobile, when he sees he 
is about to collide with a vehicle of any kind, to use 
one of the 1nethods at hand for avoiding a colli-
sion, and, when he sees that is not going to have 
the desired effect, sit, either helpless or careless, 
and fail to use other means at hand .... " 
Templeton /rs. l\7 orth ern Te.ras Tractim1 Co., et al., Texas 
1919, 217 S.\V. 440. Plaintiff n1otor cyclist was injured 
while riding along side of the track of the street rail·way 
and a vehicle in front of hin1 turned left without giving 
a signal, and plaintiff also turned left to avoid the truck 
, tan 
' i~l 
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but struck an excavation along side the track. The jury 
found plaintiff contributorily negligent. The court in 
commenting on this contributory negligence stated: 
''The plaintiff explains his failure to turn to 
the right when the driver of the truck turned to 
the left and his failure to shut off the power of 
his 1notorcycle or throw out the clutch, or apply 
the brake, by saying that it all hap!)ened so in-
stantaneously that he did not have time to think. 
It was shown, however that the plaintiff was an 
experienced operator of a n10torcycle, that his 
machine "Was in good order at the time, and the 
jury had an opportunity to observe the plaintiff 
during the trial, and we think it was all for the 
jury, and that we would not be authorized to set 
aside the finding on the ground of an insuffici-
ency of the evidence." 
(d) The jury could reasonably have found the de-
fendant negligent in failing to apply the foot brakes time-
ly enough in that defendant testified that she did not re-
move her foot from the accelerator until she was about 
21f2 to 3 car lengths from plaintiff's car (R. 19). Three 
car lengths would be about 60 feet. Defendant was travel-
ing 30 miles per hour when she first applied the foot 
brake (R. 20). If, in fact, the defendant waited until 
she was 60 feet away before rmnoving her foot from the 
accellerator, the jury could find that she would not have 
been able to stop, since according to the stopping dis-
tances stated by Officer Pierson it would require up to 
70 feet even for an emergency stop. 
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POINT II. 
A PARTY IS NOT BOUND BY THE TESTIMONY OF AN 
ADVERSE WITNESS WHOM HE HAS CALLED FOR EXAMI-
NATION, EVEN TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH TESTI-
MONY IS NOT REBUTTED. 
The appellant apparently contends that because 
plaintiff called one of the defendants, Marilynn Huber, 
as an adverse party, the plaintiff should be bound by the 
testimony of the plaintiff. Rule 43 (b) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
"Scope of Exam.in,ation and Cross-Examina-
tion. A party may interrogate any unwilling or 
hostile witness by leading questions. A party may 
call an adverse party or an officer, director, or 
managing agent of a public or private corporation 
or body politic or of a partnership or association 
which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by 
leading questions without being bound by his 
testimony and may contradict and impeach him 
in all respects as if he had been called by the ad-
verse party, and the witness thus called may be 
contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the 
adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by 
the adverse party only upon the subject matter 
of his examination in chief." 
A proper interpretation of this rule is that the plain-
tiff is bound hy only such testimony of the defendant 
as the jury elects to believe. Rulings of the Federal Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals support the contention of the plain-
tiff. 
wh 
I Wlll 
I 
aD!1 
11VI 
I 
' 1om 
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~~! o~ran ~-. Pittsburgh - Des Moines Steel Co., U. S. 
Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, July 17, 1950, 183 F·. 
2d 467. In the trial of this cause the plaintiff had called 
one, Jackson, an officer of the defendant, under Rule 43 
(b). The trial court held (86 Federal Supplement 855 at 
Page 273) that in calling an adversary, a party vouches 
for his testin1ony to son1e extent, and cannot select that 
which is favorable and reject that which is unfavorable 
where he has not attempted to contradict the unfavor-
able testinwny. However, upon appeal, the Circuit Court 
reversed the district court, and in this point held as fol-
lows: 
"We find, n1oreover, still a third error in the 
trial court's handling of the Jackson testimony 
and this one was highly prejudicial. The jury was 
instructed, with regard to it, that to the extent 
that testimony as produced from a person called 
for cross-examination is not rebutted by either di-
rect proof or circumstances it is conclusively taken 
to be true. A fair inference frmn the entire charge 
was that in the absence of rebuttal the plaintiff 
was bound by everything Jackson said. 
We do not have here a case in which a party 
calls a supposedly favorable witness who gives 
unfavorable testimony. It is frequently said in 
such situations that the party calling the witness 
is bound by his testimony. That rule has been 
assailed by Wigmore as a primitive notion which 
no longer finds defenders. But we need not in 
this case either affirm or repudiate that rule. 
Here, Jackson was called in the first place as an 
adverse witness under Rule 43 (b), which ex-
pressly provides that such an adverse witness may 
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be contradicted and impeached. Rule 43 (b), "·r 
think, is utterly inconsistent with any notion about 
being bound by his testhnony. It seems to us that 
any statement to the effect that a party is bound 
by the testimony of a witness whom he is free to 
contradict and impeach is inherently an01nalous." 
None of the cases cited by defendants support the 
contention of the defendants that their n1otions for dis-
Inissal, directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict should be gl'ianted. 
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 139, 104 Pac. 2d 772, 
(App. Br. 7) was a case where defendant collided with 
an rupproaching decedent's vehicle on the decedent's side 
of the road. The jury found the defendant to be negli-
gent in spite of defendant's explanation that the deced-
ent first cmne over onto defendant's side of the road and 
defendant turned over to decedent's side to avoid deced-
ent when decedent also turned back. The cause was re-
versed for other reasons, but the court indicated there 
was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict in 
favor of plaintiff. The jury apparently did not believe 
the explanation offered by the defendant as to why the 
collision occurred on the wrong side of the road. 
TVhite v. Pinney, et al., 99 Utah 984, 108 P. 2d 2±9, 
(App. Br. 8) 'vias a case where the jnry found no negli-
gence upon part of defendant where a wheel fr01n a dolly 
being carried on defendant's passing truck, catapulted 
fron1 defendant's truck, crossed the street and struck 
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plaintiff. The jury apparently believed the defendant's 
explanation, and no other evidence of negligence W1as in-
troduced. 
Hanson L Wecherle (Cal. 63 Pac. 2d 323, (App. Br. 
9) was not a case of failure of brakes. The decedent in 
that case was an assistant to the truck driver. The truck 
wasn't functioning properly and each time that the en-
gine failed, the decedent would get out of the truck and 
block the wheels ·while the driver started the engine. 
This had been done about twenty times, then the last 
time, the decedent dismounted from the truck, the truck 
moved backward 5 or 6 feet before it stopped. There was 
no evidence of faulty brakes. There was evidence that the 
decedent may have slipped and fallen under the wheels. 
From jury verdict for plaintiff, defendant moved both 
for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict. The trial court granted motion for new trial but 
denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict. This \Vas affirmed on appeal, the ·court saying that 
the questions involved were questions of fact for the 
jury and not questions of law to be decided upon appeal. 
Trlldeau vs. Sina Contracting Co., 62 NW 2d 492, 
cited by the appellant (Appr. Br. 10) clearly holds that 
the question of negligence in cases of claimed brake fail-
ures is for determination by the jury: 
"Ordinarily the condition of brakes and the 
1nanner of their use or application, or the failure 
to use or apply one or both lines of brakes when 
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the situation demanded, would constitute action-
able negligence if determined to be a proximate 
cause of the collision. But in the light of the testi-
mony presented here the acts and conduct of the 
defendants constitute prima facie evidence of 
negligence only and, therefore, a proper issue for 
jury determination under the charge of the trial 
court." 
''The existence of an emergency excusing an 
act otherwise negligent is, like negligence, ordi-
narily a question of fact." 
Sothoron /c. West, 180 Md. 539, 26 Atl. 2d 16, cited by 
appellant (App. Br. 11) was a case tried by the court 
without a jury in which the defendant driving a strange 
car descended a steep hill, found the brakes would not 
hold, tried the emergency brake, but could not stop in 
time to avoid collision with rear of plaintiff's vehicle 
stopped at a semaphore. Trial court granted judgment to 
defendant which was reversed on appeal. The appellate 
court commented that it was "almost inconceivable" that 
during the course of her travel the defendant would not 
have had occasion to use the brakes before arriving at 
the steep hill, said nevertheless it was her duty to inspect 
the brakes before driving. In that portion of the opinion 
quoted by ·the appellant, the court stated that '"If such a 
test shows the brakes in working order, and then they 
suddenly fail, the driver may not be liable for negligence 
in driving with them." 
Ia 
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The foregoing review of the cases cited by the appel-
lant indicates that the determination of the facts by the 
jury in cases such as the instant case should not be dis-
turbed upon appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the trial court properly 
denied the motions of the defendants for dismissal, di-
rected verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
The jury properly found the defendants guilty of negli-
gence in one or more particulars, and this verdict is 
amply supported by the evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE l{. FADEL 
Attorney for Respondent 
Bountiful, Utah 
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